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CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL EQUITY, INC. v.
NEW YORK: NO SLAM DUNK VICTORY
FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL CHILDREN
Denise C. Morgan*

INTRODUCTION

You have before you the only person in New York state-besides the folks in the Attorney General's office who actually litigated and lost the case--who does not see the Court of Appeals'
decision in Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York 1 as an
absolute, complete, slam dunk victory. Please believe me when I
say that I'm no Chicken Little. I don't routinely think that the sky
is falling down, nor is it my habit to try to convince other people
that every silver lining is attached to a major storm cloud. The fact
is, however, that right along with the CFE plaintiffs' overwhelming
victory on their state constitutional claims, in this most recent New
York state public school finance litigation, came a tremendous, and
frightening loss in federal rights.
A lot of well deserved attention has been paid to the CFE plaintiffs' victories-even George Pataki now says that the decision provides "an historic chance to improve our [public] schools."2 But,
almost no attention has been paid to what was lost. And over the
course of the ten years that I worked on the plaintiffs' side of the
Campaignfor FiscalEquity case-first representing New York City
and the Board of Education as an associate at Cleary Gottlieb,
then representing the Black, Puerto Rican, and Hispanic Legislative Caucus-a great deal has been lost.
I would like to talk about both what was won and what has been
lost. First, I'll talk about the CFE case and how the Court of Appeals decision promises to make the distribution of state aid for
public education to New York City more equitable. Then I'll talk
about the CFE plaintiffs' federal civil rights claim-which was
brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-and which
was rejected by the Court of Appeals. I'll end by explaining why
* Professor, New York Law School; B.A., Yale College, 1986; J.D., Yale Law
School, 1990.

1. 100 N.Y.2d 893 (2003) (CFE V).
2. Governor George Pataki, State of the State, (Jan. 7, 2004), available at
http://www.state.ny.us/sos2004/sos2004pdf.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2004).
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the loss of that claim is bad for the children of New York state and
is ominous for urban equity in general.
I.

CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL EQUITY: THE VICTORY

The CFE plaintiffs made two claims. I really want to focus on
their losing argument. But, so as not to play too much into a
Chicken Little image, I'll start by talking about their winning state
law claim.
It has been apparent since the turn of the twentieth century that
the New York State school funding formula is unfair in that it consistently underfunds certain school districts. Despite repeated reform efforts, 3 however, those inequities have been stubbornly
resistant to change. As a result, thousands of students in New York
City remain in underfunded, overcrowded schools with inadequate
supplies and too many uncertified teachers.4 Those funding and
resource shortfalls have a profound effect on the quality of teaching and learning in public schools in the City. Indeed, the Board of
Regents' most recent 655 Report documented
a dismaying alignment of disadvantaged students (disproportionately children of color), schools with the poorest educational
resources (fiscal and human), and substandard achievement ....
Perhaps the sharpest contrasts exist between public schools in
New York City and those in districts (most suburban) with low
percentages of students in poverty and high levels of income and
property wealth.5
Given that 73% of the children of color in New York State go to
schools in the City, that inequitable distribution of educational resources hits children of color particularly hard.6
3. See EDWIN MARGOLIS, ET. AL, THE ELUSIVE QUEST: THE STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 28, 30, 35-38 (1992) (discussing the

state's first equalization efforts in 1902, the 1921 educational Finance Inquiry
Comm'n, the 1972 Fleischmann Commission, the 1982 Rubin Task Force, and a number of other studies); see also The New York State Temporary State Commission on
the Distribution of State Aid to Local School Dists., Fundingfor Fairness(Dec. 1988)
(the Salerno Commission report); N.Y. State Special Comm'n on Educational Structure, Policies and Practices, Putting Children First (Dec. 1993) (the Moreland Act
Commission report).
4. The State of Learning: A Report to the Governor and the Legislature on the
Educational Status of the State's Schools vi (July 2003), available at

http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/irts/655report/2003/volumel-2003/655report-volumel.pdf
(last visited April 20, 2004).
5. Id.
6. See id. at 143.
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In 1993, CFE brought suit to challenge this injustice. Unlike
many of the school finance cases in other states which are based on
arguments for equity (plaintiffs are entitled to the same amount of
school aid, or educational opportunity as some other group of students), the New York state case was based on an argument for adequacy. The CFE plaintiffs argued that the New York state school
financing scheme shortchanges students in New York City and deprives them of a sound basic education in violation of the Education Article of the state constitution. 7
This past June, the Court of Appeals handed the plaintiffs an
overwhelming victory. 8 That court finally gave some content to the
New York State Education Article, which says that "[t]he legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of
free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be
educated." 9 An earlier attempt to flesh out that constitutional provision, the Levittown case decided in 1982, was a miserable failure.1" In Levittown the Court of Appeals held that the Education
Article "makes no reference to any requirement that . . .education . . .be equal or substantially equivalent in every district."1 "
That court concluded that as long as children in New York State
were getting a "sound basic education,"' 2 and in the absence of
some "gross and glaring inadequacy" in the state education system,13 it was inappropriate for it to alter the state's school financing
scheme.
The CFE case pushed the Court of Appeals to answer the question left open in Levittown: how do we know if our kids are getting
a sound basic education? That's a difficult question, but Judge
Kaye did not avoid it. Her majority opinion states that "a sound
basic education conveys not merely skills, but skills fashioned to
meet a practical goal: meaningful civic participation in contemporary society."' 4
7. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 616 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. 1994)
(CFE 1); see N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
8. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 931-32 (2003) (CFE

V).
9. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
10. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27 (1982).
11. Id. at 47.
12. Id. at 48.
13. Id.
14. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 905 (2003) (CFE V);
see also Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 316 (1995) (CFE II)
(stating "the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children
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Shockingly, the Appellate Division had accepted the state's arguments that students receive a sound basic education by the time
they have reached eighth or ninth grade (As if the State making
such a claim was not shocking enough already).15 The Appellate
Division acknowledged that that level of education was not likely
to prepare anyone for college, or for anything other than minimum
wage employment-but it dismissed that fact by saying: "It cannot
be said, however, that a person who is engaged in a 'low-level service job' is not a valuable, productive member of society. Society
needs workers in all levels of jobs, the majority of which may very
well be low level."16 There is, of course, nothing wrong with minimum wage work, but it is a spectacularly low standard to which to
aspire for New York City children, most of whom are black or
brown.
The Court of Appeals saw things differently. Judge Kaye's opinion states unequivocally that "More is required. While a sound basic education need only prepare students to compete for jobs that
enable them to support themselves, the record establishes that for
this purpose a high school level education is now all but indispensable."1 " The Court of Appeals refused to peg the state constitutional minimum to the current Board of Regents standards, but
rather described a few essential components of a meaningful high
school education: physical facilities and classrooms that provide
enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn; adequate instrumentalities of learning such as desks, chairs, pencils,
and reasonably current textbooks; and reasonably up-to-date basic
curricula taught by personnel who are adequately trained to teach
those subject areas. 18
Thus, a lot was won in CFE. Compared to the refusal of the
Levittown court to articulate any standard, or to the impossibly low
Appellate Division standard, the CFE court's interpretation of the
New York state Education Article has teeth and bite.
The CFE case was also a victory because the plaintiffs were able
to convince the court of the truth of a common sense proposition
(that turns out not to be easy to prove or to disprove): that there is
a causal link between school funding and educational opportuto eventually function productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving
on a jury").
15. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 744 N.Y.S.2d 130, 138 (App. Div.
2002) (CFE IV).
16. Id.
17. CFE V, 100 N.Y.2d at 906 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 907 (citing CFE II, 86 N.Y.2d at 317).
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nity. 19 The Court of Appeals reasoned that "better funded schools
would hire and retain more certified teachers, and that students
with such teachers would score better. [And that] the same is true
with respect to class size and instrumentalities of learning. "20
Therefore, the Court accepted that educational outcomes-graduation/dropout rates, and standardized test scores-in New York City
do not satisfy constitutional requirements, 21 because educational
inputs-meaning teachers, school facilities, classroom supplies, libraries, and textbooks-in the City are inadequate.22 The Court
refused to be distracted by the State's attempts to blame the Board
of Education, the City, and the children who live here for the failure of our public schools, but instead placed the responsibility for
ensuring a sound basic education right where the New York constitution mandates-with the state legislature.23
How the legislature will respond to that responsibility is not yet
clear. Although the CFE plaintiffs argued for a statewide remedy, 24 the court only mandated that the inequities in New York
City be corrected. 5 The state is, of course, free to improve any
educational deficiencies that it identifies. And hopefully, the state
will chose to do so, because the old funding formula did not serve
children in poor rural areas any better than it served City kids.26
The Court gave the Governor and the state legislature until the end
of July 2004 to respond to its decision-so, it will soon be apparent
whether our state officials choose to work constructively with the
court, or whether they will have to be forced to implement a constitutionally adequate school funding formula. Hopefully, the CFE
decision will force the Governor and legislature to make a long
term commitment to ensuring that every school in this City has the
resources necessary to provide children the opportunity for a
sound basic education. If it does, New York City's children will
really have won a great deal.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 919.
at 914-19.
at 920-25.
at 925-26.
at 930.
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CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL EQUITY: THE PLAINTIFF'S LOSING
FEDERAL CLAIM

In addition to their state constitutional claim, the CFE plaintiffs
also asserted a claim under the Department of Education's implementing regulations for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.27
The plaintiffs sued under those regulations because they were unable to bring their claim of race-based injury under either the Equal
Protection Clause 2 8 or Title VI itself-both of which the Supreme
Court has interpreted to require proof of intentional discrimination.2 9 In contrast, the Title VI implementing regulations prohibit
policies that disproportionately harm minority students and that
cannot be educationally justified.3" The plaintiffs argued that the
state's funding formula violates the civil rights act regulations because it treats minority students poorly relative to their similarly
situated white counterparts.3 1
To support their race-based claims, the CFE plaintiffs introduced
evidence showing that, in recent years, New York City has educated 37% of the students in New York State, but has received only
34-35% of the State's aid for education.3 2 While 2% may seem like
a small percentage, it means that the City was shortchanged by at
least $400 million dollars annually. Moreover, that shortfall disproportionately impacts minority children because the City educates
73% of the students of color in New York State and its public
school population is 84% children of color. 33 Indeed, at trial plaintiffs introduced a regression analysis that showed that instead of
ensuring that similarly needy students received the same amount of
education aid, the New York state school funding formula tends to
give "minority students.. .less State aid as their over-all concentra'34
tion increases in a particular district.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
29. See Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (holding that
compensatory relief was not available as a private remedy under Title VI in the absence of violations which involved intentional discrimination); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a statute, which was neutral on its face, had to be
applied in a way that invidiously discriminated on the basis of race).
30. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(1)-(2).
31. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 478 (Sup. Ct. 2001)
(CFE III).

32. Id. at 543.
33. Id. at 478, 542.
34. Id. at 546. The plaintiffs' regression analysis held constant factors that should
affect school funding, like district wealth, the number of English language learners,
local tax effort, student enrollment, and student attendance. Id. at 545-46.

2004]

CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL EQUITY

1297

To make matters worse, the State could not justify the racially
disparate impact of its funding formula because the plaintiffs submitted proof that it was the result of a political compromise.35 For
fifteen years or so, New York City had received 38.86% of any annual increase in aid from the state.36 As the components of the
state's funding formula--student need, the city's wealth, student
attendance, and enrollment-fluctuated over time, that number,
38.86%, remained constant.37
The trial court judge, Leland DeGrasse, was convinced by the
plaintiffs' evidence and held "that New York City does not receive
State aid commensurate with the needs of its students and... it in

fact receives less State aid than districts with similar student
need. '38 Judge DeGrasse also understood why this funding
shortfall mattered so much. He wrote that money is a crucial determinant of educational quality, and that receipt of less educais an adverse disparate impact
tional funding by minority students
39
VI.
Title
of
purview
the
within
So, why did the Court of Appeals reject what is apparently a
basic civil rights claim--namely that the state cannot treat people
of color differently than it treats similarly situated white people?
Because of the Rehnquist Court's civil rights rollback. Title VI remains a valid law--as are the regulations that have been promulgated over the years to enforce that statute. Recently, however,
the Rehnquist Court has fundamentally undermined Americans'
ability to bring suit under those civil rights laws.4° Sadly, it turns
out that a right, without a right to sue for a remedy, is often no
right at all.
One way the Supreme Court has cut back on our ability to enforce federal rights in general is by asserting that there is a difference between having a right and having the right to sue to enforce
that right (a private right of action). Under current case law, unless it can be shown that Congress made a clear statement of intent
that private individuals be able to sue to enforce a federal law, individuals will be denied that right. 41 The consequences of this interpretation are all too clear. When individuals have a private right of
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
(1979).

Id. at 533.
Id. at 534.
Id.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 529, 533, 546.
See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
See id. at 286-87; see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578
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action to enforce their federal rights, potential violators, concerned
with the possibility of being sued, are more likely to follow the law.
Without this deterrent those same persons may feel free to violate
the federal rights of others with impunity.
In crafting its statutes, Congress has historically not always been
explicit about whether it intended to confer a private right of action.42 One common reason for this is that the legislators may not
have all actually agreed upon their intent. In the past, the Supreme
Court had usually chosen to imply a private right of action and
allow individuals to sue to enforce their federal rights whenever it
deemed it was necessary to fulfill Congress' objectives.4 3 In the last
twenty-five years, however, the Court has required much more explicit proof of Congressional intent. 44 Once the Supreme Court revised its test to determine whether a private right of action exists,
Congress should have understood that it was its responsibility to be
explicit about whether a law was meant to grant this right. Congress does not, however, have that option with older statutes, like
Title VI, that were passed before the Supreme Court ratcheted up
the standard.
This issue came to a head in Alexander v. Sandoval, in which
non-English speaking residents of Alabama argued that offering
the state driver's license test only in English had a disproportionate
negative impact on them, and therefore violated their rights under
the Department of Justice's and the Department of Transportation's implementing regulations for Title VI. 4 5 The Sandoval plaintiffs lost because the Rehnquist Court held that there is no private
right of action under the Title VI implementing regulations. 46 Although the plaintiffs did have the right not to be discriminated
against, they had no means by which to enforce that right.47
42. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717-18 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
43. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-35 (1964).
44. See Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 536 (1989);
Redington, 442 U.S. at 568.
45. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
46. Id. at 293.
47. See id. In this complex case, the Court held that while Section 601 of Title VI,
which prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in certain programs and activities, creates a private right of action, Section 602, which authorizes
federal agencies to issue regulations consistent with Section 601, does not create a
private right of action. Based on the lack of explicit language in Section 602 indicating Congressional intent to create private rights, the Court could not simply presume
that Section 601 works hand-in-glove with Section 602.
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The Court has similarly rolled back the protections that other
civil rights laws have historically provided. For example, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,48 a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute, has been used by
plaintiffs to enforce federal statutes that do not contain private
rights of action.49 Under § 1983, plaintiffs are granted the right to
sue state officials in federal court for violations of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the
United States]." The Rehnquist Court, however, has also curtailed
our ability to enforce our civil rights against states and state officials through these types of suits. 50 In recent cases, the Court has
narrowly construed both who can be sued under § 198351 and what
constitutes a federal right for the purposes of that statute. 2
In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Supreme Court reversed prior
case law which had distinguished between the rigorous test for inferring a private right of action under a federal statute and the
more lenient one for determining whether a statute confers a federal right that is enforceable through § 1983. 53 Now, § 1983 suits
are virtually superfluous because they are available only when a
private right of action would exist anyway. 4
After Sandoval and Gonzaga, although the Title VI implementing regulations remain valid federal laws, it is exceedingly difficult
to go to court to sue to enforce them. There is neither a private
right of action to sue directly under the regulations, nor is there the
possibility of enforcing them through a § 1983 suit. Thus, while the
facts underlying the CFE plaintiffs' Title VI claim are still true, the
Court of Appeals was forced to dismiss their race-based claim.

48. (2004)
49. See Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 429 (1987) (permitting private § 1983 action by tenants for violation of the Brooke Amendment to
the Housing Act of 1937).
50. See David Sloss, ConstitutionalRemedies for Statutory Violations, 89 IOWA L.
REv. 355, 394-401 (2004) (discussing that the Supreme Court has deliberately limited
the availability of § 1983 as a mechanism for enforcing rights created by federal
statutes).
51. See Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
52. See Sloss, supra note 50.
53. 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) ("[A] plaintiff suing under an implied right of action
still must show that the statute manifests an intent to create not just a private right but
also a private remedy.").
54. See Sloss, supra note 50 (discussing the substantial similarity between the tests
for determining whether there is a private right of action and for determining whether
suit can be brought under § 1983).
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III.

WHY THE LOST FEDERAL CLAIM MATTERS

Why does it matter if we won the CFE case on state grounds or
on federal grounds? I have two reasons: an immediate, practical
one and a deeper, longer-term, and more theoretical one.
The immediate problem is one of strategy. The rejection of the
CFE plaintiffs' Title VI argument signals the demise of one of the
more promising new strategies to ensure that children in the
United States have access to quality education. In recent years,
Title VI education rights suits have been brought all across the
country-many of them on behalf of children of color in urban areas. For example, cases have been brought to challenge: the inappropriate shunting of black children into special education
classes; 55 the fact that qualified students lack access to advanced
placement classes; 56 the failure of school districts to provide appro57
priate programs for children whose first language is not English;
and, of course, the unfair distribution of public school finance dollars. 8 The Rehnquist Court's rollback of civil rights threatens the
outcome of these and similar future suits. Particularly for children
who live in states where the state constitution has not been interpreted to protect educational rights as generously as it has been in
New York state, the loss of that federal claim could be disastrous.
That, of course, does not explain why I think that the loss of the
plaintiffs' Title VI claim is any more significant than the loss of any
other claim would have been. But, the loss of that civil rights claim
is particularly worrisome-something significant is lost when the
law fails to recognize the type of race-based injury that the CFE
plaintiffs proved at trial.
55. See Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming district
court's holding that placement mechanisms for remedial classes operated with a discriminatory effect in violation of regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI).
56. Daniel v. California, No. BC214156 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 27, 1999), available at http://www.povertylaw.org/legalresearch/cases/index.cfm?action=abstract&id=
52606 (last visited Aug. 11, 2004).
57. See Serna v. Portales Mun. Sch., 499 F.2d 1147, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding the school district violated Title VI because they failed to institute a program that
would rectify language deficiencies in "Spanish-surnamed" children); Flores v. Ariz.,
48 F. Supp. 2d 937, 940 (D. Ariz. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs may bring suit under
Title VI).
58. See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 397 (3d Cir. 1999) (reversing lower court's
determination that plaintiffs failed to state a valid claim regarding disparate impact of
funding); Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1140 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding
plaintiffs met pleading requirements); Ceasar v. Pataki, No. 2000 WL 1154318, 4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000) (holding plaintiffs met pleading requirement to survive motion to dismiss); Kasayulie v. State, No. SAN 97-3782CTV, at 11 (Alaska Sup. Ct.
Sept. 1, 1999).
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The plaintiffs winning state law claim argues that each individual
child in New York state is entitled to a sound basic education. The
law recognizes that when the state fails to provide any individual
child with that minimum entitlement, that child is harmed-and
the law provides a remedy. In contrast, the plaintiffs' federal claim
also recognizes that the children who are shortchanged by the
state's school aid formula are not randomly distributed throughout
the state but, rather, along racial lines. The plaintiffs' federal
claim, and only their federal claim, takes into account the particular injuries caused by the unjustified misdistribution of government
resources by race, the harm to communities of color, and the harm
to our democratic society.
A distribution that has a racially disparate impact that cannot be
justified by educational necessity has consequences beyond the individual unfortunate child. State aid formulas that systematically
apportion less money to children of color than to their similarly
situated White peers reinforce the notion that people of color are
somehow less deserving, somehow less equal. Moreover, a state
funding scheme that deprives communities of color of necessary
educational resources and thereby ill prepares our children to exercise their full citizenship rights, is likely to create an enduring underclass. If equal citizenship is truly important to our national
identity, it is important that we acknowledge when we systematically fail to live up to that ideal. We then must destroy any remaining patterns of injustice that are incompatible with democracy.
Unfortunately, the facts underlying the CFE plaintiffs' Title VI
implementing regulation claim have not changed simply because
they are no longer legally actionable.
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